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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF MARSHALL
WILLIAM DUFFY,
Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
-AGAINSTLINCOLN COUNTY STATE BANK CORPORATION,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

BENCH MEMORANDUM
GEORGE B. TRUBOW* RALPH RUEBNER**
and KENNETH MICHAELS***
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
William Duffy (Duffy), a customer of Lincoln County State
Bank Corporation (Lincoln), was a controlling shareholder of
Baker Properties, Inc. (Baker), a publicly held corporation. All
parties involved in this case were domiciled in the State of Marshall. On March 26, 1981 the Marshall Tribune published an article about Baker's plans to undergo a corporate reorganization.
Nancy Barnes, an attorney with the State of Marshall Securities
Commission, was assigned to investigate Baker's reorganization
plan. In 1976 she had investigated Duffy's purchase of the controlling interest in Baker.I****
11
Barnes sent letters to banks doing business in Lincoln
County asking whether Duffy, Baker, or any other Baker shareholders maintained accounts at such banks. On April 11, 1981,
having been informed by Marcia Moore, Senior Vice-President
of Lincoln, that Duffy was a customer at Lincoln, Barnes asked
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Information Technology

and Privacy Law, The John Marshall Law School.
** Associate Professor of Law and Coordinator of the Benton National
Moot Court Competition, The John Marshall Law School.
*** Assistant to the Director, Center for Information Technology and
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Moore to send her a list of Duffy's account numbers and types of
accounts maintained there. Moore directed the Lincoln data
processing department to send the requested information to
Barnes.
Lincoln used an electronic data system to collect and store
information about its customers, including all transactions relating to any account, as well as financial and other personal information concerning its customers. Upon receipt of Moore's
order, Robert Cross, a Lincoln employee, entered the following
search for the requested information:
PRINT: WILLIAM DUFFY (NAME ADDRESS, ACCOUNT
NUMBR, ACCT TYPE).
A computer print-out was automatically mailed to Barnes by
Lincoln's computer. This print-out revealed all of Duffy's personal transactions from January 15, 1981, to April 15, 1981, rather
than merely the limited information asked for in the search request. Barnes noticed a $75,000 electronic fund transfer to
Duffy's personal account from Baker's account at First State
Bank of Marshall, made on January 20, 1981.
On June 6, 1981, Barnes obtained a judicial subpoena from
the state court ordering Lincoln to disclose Duffy's personal
bank records, including loan applications, from January 1, 1976,
to date. Lincoln promptly complied with the request. Lincoln
informed Duffy, on June 11, 1981, that it was cancelling Duffy's
$150,000 line of credit because of the commission's investigations
into his personal finances. He had acquired the line of credit in
1980.
Without the line of credit Duffy was unable to exercise an
option he held to purchase certain land in Douglas County, Marshall, by June 15, 1981. His option was to purchase the land for
$140,000. On June 16, 1981, after the option had expired, another
12 party purchased the same land for $220,000.1
On June 20, 1981, at a meeting with Barnes, Duffy presented
notes and corporate documents evidencing that the payment of
$75,000 to Duffy by Baker was in cancellation of a shareholder
loan made by Duffy on March 17, 1979. On July 14, 1981, Barnes
sent Duffy a letter informing him that the Commission's investigation was closed with a finding of no impropriety on Duffy's
part. Included with the letter were the computer print-outs
Barnes had received from Lincoln pursuant to her requests of
April 11, 1981, and the subpoena of June 6, 1981.
Duffy brings action against Lincoln in the Marshall state
court. Count I of the complaint alleges that Lincoln should be
held strictly liable for injury resulting from the escape of the information, on grounds that to maintain large quantities of per-
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sonal financial information in a computer is an abnormally
dangerous or ultrahazardous activity. Count II, in the alternative, alleges that Lincoln negligently allowed the personal information to be disclosed, contrary to Duffy's expectation of
confidentiality of the information. Duffy further alleges that
under the negligence standard of liability, res ipsa loquitur applies since the computer which disclosed that information was
in Lincoln's control and but for the failure to exercise due care
the disclosure would not have been made.
Defendant Lincoln moved to dismiss Count I, arguing that
collecting and maintaining information in computers is not an
ultrahazardous activity since doing so is a common activity in
public and private sectors; that the use of computers is necessary and valuable to society; and, that the use of a computer is
necessary to effect Lincoln's purpose of lending money and
monitoring its customer's financial activities. Lincoln also
moved to dismiss Count II, contending that a bank has no duty
under the common law to protect the confidentiality of its customer's bank records, and since there is no express agreement
with Duffy no duty has been breached; therefore, res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable.
Duffy's response in opposition to the motion to dismiss focused on public policyL to support strict liability because the 13
Lincoln computer stores great quantities of sensitive, personal
information and computers, despite the exercise of care, are
prone to error in processing information. Furthermore, Duffy
contended, the same policy supports a common law duty to protect this personal information from improper disclosures.
The state circuit court denied Lincoln's motion to dismiss
on both counts. The court found the public policy arguments
persuasive to support strict liability against the bank. Implicit
in this holding was a recognition of the bank's duty to its customers to prevent personal information disclosures. Since this
duty existed Lincoln's motion to dismiss the negligence count
was also denied. The trial court then certified the case for immediate appeal, since a substantial ground existed for difference
of opinion on questions of law and an immediate appeal would
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.
Afffirming in part and reversing in part, the State of Marshall
Appellate Court refused to apply strict liability on the grounds
that to do so would place an unreasonable burden on
recordkeepers. The appellate court held, however, that Lincoln
does have a duty to protect sensitive personal financial information from improper disclosure, so the negligence standard applied. Furthermore, due to the state of the art of computer
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technology and the difficulty of proving breach under the circumstances, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied.
The Supreme Court of the State of Marshall granted leave
to appeal and cross-appeal to Duffy and Lincoln.
II.

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE COMPUTER

A computer receives, stores, manipulates, and communicates information. The central processing unit (CPU) is the
heart of the computer and performs the basic arthmetic and
logic functions of computing and supervises the operation of the
14 entire system.I
Information is entered into the computer by a keyboard or
from magnetic tapes or disks. The computer usually displays its
output on a monitor (cathode ray tube or video display terminal), but the output can also be printed on paper.
The physical parts of a computer, including the electronic
elements and the various peripheral devices (input-output
mechanisms), constitute the hardware. The hardware can do
nothing by itself; it requires a set of programs, or instructions,
called software. At the core of the software is an "operating system" that controls the computer's operations, manages the flow
on information throughout the system, and interfaces between
the machine and the human operator and between the machine
and an "application program". An application program enables
the computer to perform specific functions, e.g., collect, store, or
manipulate financial information in a bank account.
For information to be processed, it must be stored, at least
temporarily, in the computer's memory banks. There are two
kinds of main memory: read-only memory (ROM) and randomaccess memory (RAM). ROM is for information that is stored
permanently, such as the operating system program. ROM cannot be altered because it is installed by the manufacturer and
not accessible to the user. RAM, however, accepts information,
which can be entered and "read out" as often as needed. RAM is
temporary memory; data can be stored in or taken from RAM at
any time by the user.
Secondary memory devices, such as tapes or disks, can
store information for processing by the computer, at which time
the data is "read into" the RAM. When the computer has completed the designated functions, the information can be displayed on various output devices, or returned to secondary
memory storage, or both.
In the case under consideration here, Lincoln's customer account information is stored in secondary information storage de-
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vices. An applications program permits customer account
information to be retrieved, manipulated and displayed. Here,
theL employee Cross entered an appropriate search command±15
to retrieve certain designated information, but for some unexplained reason the computer retrieved and caused to be printed
a complete account summary for Duffy. This printout was automatically mailed to Barnes, as Moore had directed. The error
could have resulted from a problem in the application program
or because of some hardware malfunction. In any event, the
parties to this case are not pursuing any product liability claims
at this time.
III.

A.

SHOULD A BANK BE HELD STRICTLY LIABLE
FOR INJURY CAUSED BY THE UNEXPECTED
RELEASE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION FROM
THE BANK'S COMPUTER?

Historic Development of Strict Liability

The doctrine of imposing strict liability for injury resulting
from abnormally dangerous conditions or activities arose from
the English case of Rylands v. Fletcher.' In Rylands the defendants had constructed a reservoir on their land. Water in the reservoir broke through into an abandoned mine shaft below,
flowed through mine passageways, and flooded a coal mine located on the plaintiffs land.
The Court of Exchequer held that the plaintiff could not recover damages for injuries suffered to his coal mine since he
could not prove negligence, nor an intentional trespass. 2 On appeal, the Exchequer Chamber reversed, Judge Blackburn writing for a unanimous court:
We think the rule of law is, that the person who for his
own purposes brings on his land and collects and
keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes,
must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do so, is
prima facie answerable for all damage
which is the
3
natural consequence of its escape.
The House of Lords affirmed the Exchequer Chamber, and
substantially agreed with Blackburn's opinion, although Lord
Cairnes, writing for the majority, restricted Blackburn's opinion
by distinguishing between non-natural uses of the land, e.g., aL 16
reservoir of water, and natural uses of the land, e.g., water naturally accumulated on the land.4 Because the defendants
1.
2.
3.
4.

3 L.R. - E.& I. App. 330 (1868).
Fletcher v. Rylands, 3 H & C 774, 150 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865).
Fletcher v. Rylands, 1 L.R. - Ex. Ch. 265, 279 (1865).
Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R. - E. & I. App. at 338-39.
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brought upon their land and accumulated a large quantity of
water they were liable for the consequences of their conduct
"however skillfully and carefully the accumulation was made."
The English courts subsequently applied the Rylands rule
to hold a railway company liable when sparks from its engine
ignited a fire on adjacent land. Janes v. Festiniog Rwy. 5
Soon thereafter, in Powell v. Fall, strict liability was applied
against the owner of a traction engine when a spark from the
vehicle set fire to a hayrick on a public road:
It is just and reasonable that if a person uses a dangerous machine, he should pay for the damage it occasions; if the reward which he gains for the use of the
machine will not pay for the damages, it is mischievious to the public and ought to be suppressed, for the
loss ought not to be borne by the community or the in-

jured person. If the use of the machine is profitable,6
the owner ought to pay compensation for the damage.

During the first qecade of the twentieth century the English
courts curtailed the expanding application of strict liability
when the doctrine was held inapplicable for owners of motor
buses operating on public highways. 7 As the novelty of the new
technology of motor driven vehicles eroded, so did the application of strict liability. The English courts appear to apply the
rule of Rylands only when there has been an escape of something that causes harm:
In all cases which have been decided, it has been held
necessary, in order to establish liability, that there
should have been some form of escape from the place
in which the dangerous object has been retained by
the defendant to some other place not subject to his
control.

_-7 Read v. J. Lyons & Co., Ltd. 8±
B. Strict Liability in the United States
The American experience with strict liability has been
troublesome. Shortly after Rylands was decided in England,
courts in Massachusetts and Minnesota adopted the doctrine in
5. 3 L.R. - Q.B. 733 (1868).

6. 5 Q.B. D. 597, 601 (1880) (Bramwell L.J.).
7. Wing v. L.G.O.C., 2 K.B. 652 (1909); Parker v. L.G.O.C., 73 J.P. 283
(1909). See Spencer, Motor-Cars and the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher: A
Chapter of Accidents in the History of Law and Motoring, 42 CAMBRIDGE

LJ. 65, 72-73 (1983). Spencer advances several possible reasons, including
moral notions of fault and the increasing frequency of accidents involving
motor driven vehicles, why English courts refused to apply strict liability to
motor-car users. Id. at 73-79.
8. A.C. 156, 177 (1947) (Lord Porter).
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cases involving water escaping onto the land of others. 9 Soon
thereafter New Hampshire, New York and New Jersey sounded
an apparent death knell for the doctrine in America. 10
Dean Prosser analyzes the development of strict liability in
America's new industrial age:
[TI he doctrine was condemned by legal writings as an
unjustifiable extension of liability to unavoidable accidents, in a field where the law of negligence, aided by
the principle of res ipsa loquitur, would be adequate to
cover the cases where recovery should be allowed."
Prosser suggests that while the new industrialization of
America created high degrees of risks to others, applying strict
liability against users of new industrial technology would hamper economic and industrial growth. In time these values
shifted as jurists realized that users of the new technology, for
the purposes of profit-making activities, should be liable as insurers of the high risks to others inherent in using the new
12
technology.
Despite its early cold reception in America, the Rylands
13
rule was eventually adopted by most of the jurisdictions.
Sometimes courts which initially rejected the rule later adopted
it under a theory of continuous or absolute nuisance. 14 By the
time the first Restatement of Tort was promulgated in 1934, the
focus for application of strict liability had shifted from land use
to "ultrahazardous activities."' 15 In the second Restatement of
Torts the drafters adopted an "abnormally dangerous activity"
6
analysis.'
The liability arises out of the abnormal danger of the
activity itself, and the risk that it creates, of harm to
those in the vicinity ...The defendant's enterprise, in
9. Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582 (1868) (percolating filthy water spilled over
into plaintiffs land polluting his well and cellar); Cahill v. Eastman, 18

Minn. 324 (1871) (underground water tunnel broke through washing away
plaintiffs land and buildings).

10. Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442 (1873) (runaway horses scared by railroad engine); Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873) (explosion of steam
boiler); Marshall v. Wellwood, 38 N.J.L. 339 (1876) (explosion of steam

boiler). Prosser notes that in each of these three cases where American
courts rejected the Rylands rule, the courts did not consider Lord Cairnes

demarcation between natural and non-natural land uses, yet each case involved "customary, natural uses, to which the English courts would never
have applied the rule." PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 78

(1971).
11.

PROSSER,

supra note 10, at § 78 (cites omitted).

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15.

16.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 (1938).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519

(1977).
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other words, is required to pay its way by compensating for the harm it causes, because
of its special, abnor17
mal and dangerous character. 1
The list of factors to be considered in determining whether an
activity is abnormally dangerous focuses on risk analysis and
the nature of the activity in the community in which it is
conducted. 18
The application of strict liability is not limited to cases involving real property. Today American courts apply the rule of
Rylands to a wide variety of cases. Strict liability has been held
applicable to cases involving animals, 19 ground damage from
aviation, 20 blasting with explosives, 2 1 escaping dangerous
gases, 22 gasoline and oil transportation and storage,23 industrial
26
25
waste, 24 pile driving, and rocketry.
The first Restatement of the Law, Torts adopted the Rylands rule under an ultrahazardous activity analysis.
...[O ne who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is
liable to another whose person, land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity...
Restatement of Torts § 519 (1938). An activity is ultrahazardous
if it:
(a)

necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the
person, land or chattels of others which cannot be
eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care,
and

(b)

is not a matter of common usage.

Restatement of Torts § 520 (1938). This treatment appears to accept Lord Cairnes' limitation in terms of non-natural use "not a
matter of common usage.
17. Id. at comment d.
18. Id. at § 520 (1977).
19. McKee v. Trisler, 311 111. 536, 143 N.E. 69 (1924).
20. Porcell v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. W. Va. 1951).
21. Spano v. Perini Corp., 25 N.Y. 2d 11, 250 N.E. 2d 31, 302 N.Y.S. 2d 527
(1969).
22. McLane v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 255 Ore. 324, 467 P.2d 635
(1970).
23. Yommer v. McKenzie, 255 Md. 220, 257 A.2d 138 (1969).
24. Dutton v. Rocky Mountain Phosphates, 151 Mont. 54, 438 P.2d 674
(1968) (phosphate manufacturer released flourine gas into the air causing
damage to crops and livestock); Cf., Nelson v. C & C Plywood Co., 154 Mont.
414, 465 P.2d 314 (1970) (narrowly construing Dutton by limiting strict liability application to the facts in Dutton).
25. Corporate v. C.W. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc., 175 A.2d 561 (Conn. 1961);
Sachs v. Chiat, 162 N.W. 2d 243 (Minn. 1968).
26. Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 56 Cal. Rptr.
128 (1967).
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The second Restatement of Torts discusses the abnormally
dangerous activity:
General Principle:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land
or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the
harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm,
the possibility of which makes the activity abnormally
dangerous.±
19
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 (1977).
Abnormally Dangerous Activities:
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some
harm to the person, land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that harm that results from it will
be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise
of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of
common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place
where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is
outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
Restatement (Second) of Torts 520 (1977). Here the inquiry
shifts to a balancing of interests, rather than asking whether the
activity in question "is a matter of common usage."

IV. WHAT IS A BANK'S LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE IN
RELEASING CUSTOMER FINANCIAL RECORDS?
To hold one liable for the negligent disclosure on personal

information presumes a duty to act with care to maintain the
confidentiality of such information. This problem specifically focuses on the degree of confidentiality, if any, afforded to personal financial information kept by a bank about its customers.
In the common law jurisdiction of the State of Marshall, no constitutional or legislative provisions specifically protect a right to
financial privacy.±
110
A.

What Privacy and Confidentiality Expectations Attach to Bank

Records?
Regarding personal information, the terms "privacy" and
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confidentiality" are often interchangeably used and confused. 27
Privacy is the value or interest underlying expectations of confidentiality in personal information. Privacy is a interest concerning the person; confidentiality relates to information about a
person.28 When personal information 29 is kept confidential, by
one who receives it, the privacy of the transferor is protected.
Whether a recordkeeper has a duty to maintain the confidentiality of information, in certain circumstances depends on whether
the person to whom the information pertain has reason to expect such confidentiality.
In United States v. Miller,30 a depositor charged with federal
offenses sought to suppress production of his bank records pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum. The depositor challenged production of the records under the fourth amendment contending
that the records were personal, kept by the banks for a limited
purpose, and that he had a "reasonable expectation of privacy"
in the records. The Court found that "no legitimate expectation
of privacy" existed in the contents of the records:
The checks are not confidential communications but

negotiable instruments to be used in commercial
transactions. All of the documents obtained, including
financial statements and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to 3their
employees in the ordinary course of
1

business.
The Miller decision stands today for the proposition that a customer does not have federal constitutional privacy rights in his
or her bank records.
In response to Miller, Congress enacted the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 [RFPA].32
The [RFPA] represents a compromise between the individual's interest in the confidentiality of records and
27. This confusion arises in part from difficulties in fashioning a defini-

tion of "privacy" which is not overexpansive or underinclusive. See, Gerety,
Redefining Privacy, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 233 (1977).
28. "[Ilt takes only one person to make information private, it takes two

at least to make information, even originally private information, confidential." Id. at 282.

29. "Personal information is defined as any information that can be referred to a specific individual by name, number, or other identifying charac-

teristics." Trubow, The Development and Status of Information Privacy
Law and Policy in the United States, Invited Papers on Privacy: Law, Ethics, and Technology (presented at the National Symposium on Personal
Privacy and Information Technology October 4-7, 1981) (available from the
American Bar Association's Section of Individual Rights and

Responsibilities).

30. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
31. Id. at 442.
32. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401 et seq. (Supp. 111978).
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the needs of federal law enforcement. The Act does establish for the individual, in accordance with the recommendation of the [Privacy Protection Study
Commission], a protectable interest in records main± 11
tained by financial institutions. 331
The Act creates a confidentiality expectation in bank records to
the extent that certain federal agencies seek disclosure of the
records. 34 The Act does not prohibit disclosure of bank records;
rather, it prescribes certain avenues of access which federal
agencies must follow to obtain disclosure. It also requires that
in most circumstances notice 35 be given to the customer prior to
disclosure, and the customer is empowered to challenge disclosure of records through judicial process.
At least four states recognize privacy rights in bank records
arising from state constitutions. In Burrows v. Superior Court of
San Bernardino County,36 the California Supreme Court held
that "petitioner had a reasonable expectation that the bank
would maintain the confidentiality of those papers which
originated with him in check form and of the bank statements
into which a record of those same checks had been transformed
pursuant to internal bank practice. ' 37 The Burrows Court focused on contemporary American lifestyles to support its
holding:
For all practical purposes, the disclosure by individuals or business firms of their financial affairs to a bank
is not entirely volitional, since it is impossible to participate in the economic life of contemporary society
without maintaining a bank account.
In the course of such dealings, a depositor reveals
many aspects of his personal affairs, opinions, habits
and associations. Indeed, the totality38of bank records
provides a virtual current biography.
In Charnes v. Di Giacomo,39 and Commonwealth v. De
John,4° the Supreme Courts of Colorado and Pennsylvania, respectively, followed Burrows and found that depositors enjoy
confidentiality expectations in their bank records pursuant to
33. Trubow & Hudson, The Right to FinancialPrivacy Act of 1978: New
Protectionfrom FederalIntrusion, 12 J. MAR.J. PRAc. &PRoc. 487, 505 (1979)
(cite omitted).
34. 12 U.S.C. § 3403(a).
35. The Miller Court perhaps suggested that some notice of the disclosure should have been given to Miller. "Nor did the banks notify respondent, a neglect without legal consequences here, however unattractive it
may be." 425 U.S. at 443 n.5.
36. 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
37. Id. at 243, 529 P.2d at 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
38. Id. at 247, 529 P.2d at 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
39. 612 P.2d 1117 (Colo. 1980).
40. 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979).
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Court, First District,
state constitutions. The Illinois Appellate
41
recently took a similar position.
Some states have financial privacy statutes, patterned after
the RFPA, which prescribe procedures for access to customer
bank records by state agencies or others. The State of Marshall
does not have such a statute.
Aside from statutory protection, some jurisdictions recognize a common law prohibition of disclosure to third parties be_12 cause of an expectation of confidentialityL in the records. In the
seminal case of Tournierv. National Provincialand Union Bank
of England,42 the English Court of Appeal held that a bank had
breached an implied duty of nondisclosure when it informed the
depositor's employer that one of the depositor's checks was payable to a local bookmaker; the depositor was promptly fired, and
he prevailed against the bank in a suit for damages.
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals, citing Tournier,
also held a bank liable for civil damages where the bank disclosed to the local police a cash deposit of sequential bills. The
plaintiff depositor was subsequently arrested for armed robbery
on the basis of the bank's disclosure. Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller.43 The fact that charges against the depositor was eventually
dropped did not vitiate the bank's civil liability. The Waller
court based its decision on an implied contractual duty not to
disclose customer records information absent compulsion by
law or a customer's consent.4 A Maryland statute4 5 mandated
that an employee of a fiduciary institution who knowingly and
willfully discloses financial records is guilty of a misdemeanor.
The Waller court considered such legislation as an articulation
46
of public policy buttressing its holding.
Other American courts have addressed this issue and held,
for various reasons, that banks have a duty not to breach a customer's confidentiality expectations in his or her bank records.
In Brex v. Smith, 146 A. 34, 36 (N.J.Eq. 1929), the court said that
"It] he information contained in the records is certainly a property right", and the bank was held to an implied obligation to
protect account records from the scrutiny of the prosecutor until
compelled by a court to do otherwise. In Milohnich v. FirstNational Bank of Miami Springs, 224 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969), a bank was held to have an implied legal duty not to dis41. People v. Jackson, 116 Ill. App. 3d 430, 452 N.E. 2d 85 (1983).
42. 1 K.B. 461 (1924).
43. 408 A. 2d 758 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
44. Id. at 764.
45. MD. ANN. CODE art. 11, § 227(a) (1976).
46. 408 A. 2d. at 764.
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close information about a depositor's accounts willfully, maliciously, negligently or intentionally to individual third parties.± 113
B.

Is the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur Applicable to this Case?

One noted scholar explains the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
thus:
[W]here it is shown that the thing or instrumentality
which cause the injury complained of was under the
control of management of the defendant, and that the
occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the
ordinary course of things would not happen if those
who had its control or management used proper care,
.there is sufficient evidence .... that the injury arose
from or was caused by the defendant's want of care."
Spiser, The Negligence Case: Res Ipsa Loquitur § 1.1
(1972).
In the majority of the American courts, the operational effect of the doctrine is to raise an inference of negligence on the
defendant's part. Drewick v. Interstate Terminals, Inc., 42 Ill.2d
345, 247 N.E.2d 877 (1969) (steel ventilator-window sash fell from
building striking plaintiff on head and shoulders); Wilson v.
Paul, 176 N.W.2d 807 (Iowa 1970) (plumbing contractor's employee was sweating pipes using a blow torch and fire broke out
between the walls from which the pipes projected); George Foltis, Inc. v. New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 38 N.E.2d 455 (1941) (break of
a city water main); Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682,
268 P.2d 1041 (1954) (crop damage resulting from manufacture of
insecticide); See Speiser, supra, at § 3:4.
In a few states the doctrine creates a presumption of negligence. Holmes v. Birmingham Transit Co., 116 So.2d 912 (Ala.
1959) (res ipsa loquitur held not to apply, however, where plaintiff fell through open bus door while exiting the bus); Weiss v.
Axler, 328 P.2d 88 (Colo. 1958) (loss of hair after administration
of permanent wave); Easterling v. Walton, 156 S.E.2d 787 (Va.
1967) (physician's failure to remove a laparotomy pad from
plaintiff's abdomen before closing the incision).
Whether an inference or a presumption, the Restatement of
Torts suggests:
To determine whether res ipsa loquitur applies the
courts will ask whether.
a. the event is of the kind which ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of negligence;
b. other responsible causes, including the conduct of
the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently
eliminated by the evidence; andi±
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c. the indicated negligence is within the scope of the
defendant's duty to the plaintiff.
±15 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328 D (1977).±

